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THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
Professor Dr. Jutta Limbach*
I. THE REPUTATION OF THE COURT
N speeches and articles regarding the Basic Law's fiftieth anniver-
sary, the Federal Constitutional Court has been praised sumptuously.
It has been claimed that the Court has unfolded and empowered Ba-
sic Rights. Very figuratively, one could say: the Federal Constitutional
Court has given the Basic Law splendor and radiance while strongly pol-
ishing it as well. But the road to a democratic constitutional state has not
been easy. Rather, the Germans learned how to read their Basic Law
very slowly. They probably never would have succeeded if the Federal
Constitutional Court had not tirelessly exercised the constitutional al-
phabet with them. Part of this process, however, was that the German
politicians had to learn what an abundance of competences they had con-
ferred upon the Court.
Indeed, the Federal Constitutional Court has enjoyed notable respect
for many years. In a questionnaire about citizens' trust in twelve institu-
tions of public life in the Federal Republic of Germany, the Court has
been ranked at the top for many years. Despite strong public criticism in
recent years, it currently shares first place with the police. The govern-
ment and the political parties, by contrast, occupy the bottom places on
the scale of trust.1
The frequency with which citizens invoke the Court seems to confirm
these findings. Using a constitutional complaint, anyone claiming to have
had a fundamental right infringed by an act of the authorities may seek
protection from the Federal Constitutional Court. The constitutional
complaint may be directed against an executive, judicial, or (less com-
monly) legislative action. In only a few years, the constitutional com-
plaint became an extraordinarily popular cause of action. This popularity
still continues. Since reunification, some 5,000 constitutional complaints
have been lodged annually. Admittedly, only around two percent are
successful. But the low success rate should not make one underestimate
this right of appeal. It is the paradigmatic effect of the decisions that is
important for the future conduct of politicians, officials, and judges.
* President, Federal Constitutional Court, Karlsruhe, Germany.
1. See Bundesverband Deutscher Banken (ed.), INTER/ESSE, Wirtschaft und Politik
in Daten und Zusammenhangen, Nov. 1997 at 2.
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II. IMPACT ANALYSIS
Do these survey data and court statistics suffice, though, to draw con-
clusions as to the Federal Constitutional Court's central role in constitu-
tional practice? Does Germany's pride in the Basic Law already show its
people are patriots of the constitution? What about the Court's influence
on lower courts and political practice? Has the Federal Constitutional
Court managed to bring politics under the law? What has it achieved in
the context of political culture in the Federal Republic? All these ques-
tions can be answered only by carefully analyzing research regarding the
Court's impact. This means analyzing legal sociological studies about the
effectiveness of the Court's decisions; however, such studies are still in
their infancy. 2
Initial theoretical studies are dealing with the effectiveness, implemen-
tation, and evaluation of the Federal Constitutional Court's case law.
These studies are developing parameters or dimensions whereby the ef-
fects of the Court's decisions can be described and analyzed. Such pa-
rameters include, for instance, knowledge of the case law, how far
decisions conform with the Court's objectives, and the decisions' influ-
ence on social values and political culture.3 To date, empirical studies are
only fragmentary, especially regarding knowledge of the law, political cul-
ture, and change in values. The preferred field for this sort of research is
mainly criminal law, sometimes labor law, but only very rarely the Fed-
eral Constitutional Court, which has remained primarily an object for
studying sociology of the legal profession only.
Accordingly, I cannot base what I have to say about the effects of the
Federal Constitutional Court's decisions on empirical studies. In accor-
dance with the state of research, I shall therefore merely select a few
aspects of the history of the Federal Constitutional Court's impact and
illustrate them. In so doing I shall distinguish between the legal, political,
and social effects of the decisions.
III. THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
AS LEGAL FORCE
What can best be shown is how the Federal Constitutional Court acts as
a legal force. Its interpretation of the constitution affects the parliament's
lawmaking and the courts' legal practice. A constitutional norm explicitly
stipulates that decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court are binding
on all constitutional bodies, courts, and authorities.
Allow me to make things specific by showing the effect, reaching far
beyond the individual case, of an early decision of the Federal Constitu-
tional Court: the Lath decision.4 This decision has also contributed in a
2. See Thomas Gawron & Ralf Rogowski, Effektivitiit, Implementation und Evalua-
tion, Wirkungsanalyse am Beispiel von Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, in
ZEITSCHIRIFT FOR RECHISSOZIOLOGIE 177, 178 (1996).
3. Cf. Gawron, supra note 2, at 179-85.
4. See BVerfGE 7, 198.
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major way to refining the machinery and articulating the standards and
methods of protecting fundamental rights. 5 It set the course for the ra-
diating effect of fundamental rights in all other areas of law.
According to this decision, Basic Rights are not merely defensive rights
of individuals against the state. Furthermore, they influence the relations
between the citizens amongst themselves. For the constitution has, so the
Court ruled, created an objective value system through the catalogue of
Basic Rights. They are not only subjective rights, but also objective prin-
ciples. This objective value system spreads to all sections of the law.
Thus, no statute may be in discordance with the value system of the Basic
Rights, but must be interpreted in its spirit.6
The Lath decision focused attention on the so-called radiating effect of
fundamental rights. The Court thus developed a variety of affirmative or
protective duties, which oblige the State, especially the legislature, to pro-
tect human rights against threats from private individuals or groups. In the
course of more than forty-eight years of jurisprudence, the Court has
drawn several conclusions from the premise that human rights are also
objective principles.
This fundamental finding has not been welcomed by everybody, be-
cause the borderline between constitutional law and ordinary law blurs
when the Basic Rights penetrate the whole legal and social order. In fact,
this decision has led to an "omnipresence of the fundamental rights in the
5. The facts of the Liith case: Veit Harlan was a popular film director under the Nazi
regime and the producer of the notoriously anti-Semitic film Jud Seiss. In 1950 he directed
a new movie entitled Immortal Lover. Erich L~ith, Hamburg's director of information and
an active member of a group seeking to heal the wounds between Christians and Jews, was
outraged by Harlan's reemergence as a film director. Speaking before an audience of mo-
tion picture producers and distributors, he urged his listeners to boycott the movie Immor-
tal Lover. In his view, the boycott was necessary because of Harlan's Nazi past: he was one
of the important exponents of antisemitism. And Luth was concerned that Harlan's
reemergence would strongly renew the distrust against Germany. The film's producer and
distributor secured an order from the Superior Court of Hamburg forbidding Luth to call
for a boycott. The Court regarded Luth's action as an incitement in violating the law of
torts. Luth successfully filed a constitutional complaint asserting a violation of his basic
right to free speech by the Superior Court of Hamburg.
6. The Court said in the Liith decision:
The primary purpose of the basic rights is to safeguard the liberties of the
individual against interferences by public authority. They are defensive
rights of the individual against the state .... It is equally true, however, that
the Basic Law is not a value-neutral document. Its section on basic rights
establishes an objective order of values, and this order strongly reinforces the
effective power of basic rights. This value system, which centers upon dignity
of the human personality developing freely within the social community,
must be looked upon as a fundamental constitutional decision affecting all
spheres of law (public and private). It serves as a yardstick for measuring
and assessing all actions in the areas of legislation, public administration, and
adjudication. Thus it is clear that basic rights also influence the development
of private Law. Every provision of private law must be compatible with this
system of values, and every such provision must be interpreted in its spirit.
BVerfGE 7, 198 (204); see THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL RE-
PUBLIC OF GERMANY 363 (Donald P. Kommers trans., Duke University Press 2d ed. 1997).
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process of interpreting and applying ordinary statute law."'7 The conse-
quences of this result have been enormously broad, especially for civil
law, because the thinking in private law has changed fundamentally since
the beginning of the century. Certainly, private autonomy continues to
be the guiding principle of civil law, that of Social State has also become
one of the main pillars of civil law. Under the influence of the fundamen-
tal rights and the Social State clauses, a social law of obligations has de-
veloped through an interaction between case law and legislation. What
this means is a kind of law that takes the power gap or power imbalance
between contractual partners into account and protects the economically
inferior, the socially weak. Examples of this are socially just tenancy law
and consumer protection laws.
The Court's most recent decision concerns the law of suretyship. The
case concerned a young woman who had become hopelessly over-in-
debted through a surety bond. She had stood surety for a high bank
credit to her father, although she had only a small income (DM 1,150 per
month). The Federal Constitutional Court decided that the civil courts
ought to monitor the content of such contracts, and, where necessary,
declare them void, provided that the guarantor is structually inferior and
the suretyship is an unusually heavy burden on him or her.8
The Federal Constitutional Court's case law on the radiating effect of
fundamental rights has not only been applauded, but also heavily criti-
cized. The crisis of the Social State promotes the desire to set bounds on
case law that is seen as paternalistic. On the other hand, the case law on
the radiating effect of fundamental rights favors a great breadth and in-
tensity of supervision. It enlarges the Federal Constitutional Court's po-
tential for control, thus curtailing the ordinary courts' competencies. In
addition, it leads to a loss of parliamentary power and a gain of court
power, all in the name of human rights.
IV. THE POLITICAL INFLUENCE
That brings me to the political impact of the Federal Constitutional
Court's case law. There is no doubt that the Federal Constitutional Court
is an outstanding factor in the political process. The Court adjudicates in
the name of the Basic Law. Its operation extends into the political
sphere, because its criterion is the constitution of a political community.
As we all know, the checking of power is necessarily a power in itself.9
I am interested in the influence the Court's decisions have on political
debate and decision-making. By looking at the political debates inside
and outside parliament, it becomes apparent that during the legislative
7. Thus Ossenbilhl, Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit und Fachgerichtsbarkeit, in FEST-
SCHRIFI FOR H.P. IPSEN 129-38 (1977).
8. See BVerfGE 89, 214.
9. As he tellingly puts it in relation to judging in general, see Adolf Arndt, Das Bild




procedure, participants in the debate already orient themselves on future
and likely forthcoming decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court.
MPs mostly engage lawyers to interpret the relevant decisions right down
to the details. The experts then sometimes play the part of the Delphic
Oracle if they have to foresee coming decisions of the Court. Especially
in the political debate on parity codetermination (equal representation
for management and labor on supervisory boards of firms), politicians
and lawyers alike refer not just to the Basic Law, but primarily to the
Federal Constitutional Court's case law. Rarely has a threatened or in-
timidatingly aired action before the Federal Constitutional Court had
such far-reaching pre-emptive effects in terms of anticipated reactions
and adjustments on the legislative process.' 0 When Federal Chancellor
Helmut Schmidt was asked by workers in 1974 when the Codetermina-
tion Act was finally going to be passed, he answered: "The question is
whether that damned pettifogging CSU lot aren't going to drag it all
before the Federal Constitutional Court again.""
This tendency towards anticipatory obedience has, if anything, gotten
stronger over the years. We, as judges, can be proud if this omnipresence
of the Federal Constitutional Court in the political debate points towards
a sensitivity regarding fundamental rights by politicians. But that is only
true to a limited extent. In the upper and lower House, and among the
public, political argument is seasoned daily by using the accusation of the
alleged unconstitutionality of a planned decision. The threat of taking
the road to Karlsruhe is now part of the ritual stock-in-trade of politics in
Germany. This anticipation of a constitutional risk, or a risk from the
Federal Constitutional Court, leads to risk-aversion and hostility towards
innovation. Hence, anticipatory obedience is harmful to the social imagi-
nation and tends to cripple the legislator's delight in deciding.
A. THE LIMITS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
Such obedience, which hurries ahead, does not come about without
cause. Federal Constitutional Court's critics would instantly point out
that it is the consequence of judicial activism. They reproach the judges
for knitting the net of constitutional preconditions tighter and thus re-
stricting the scope of action for politics. As a member of the scolded
Court, I will not discuss this reproach. Rather, I would focus on whether
adjudication can be separated from political action. Despite contradic-
tory views, it is still readily held that judging means finding, not shaping.
That is, there is a qualitative difference between adjudication and law-
making: ideally, finding the law is a matter for adjudication, while making
the law is a task for politics.
10. See CHRISTINE LANDFRIED, BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT UND GESETZGEBER,
WIRKUNGEN DER VERFASSUNGSRECHTSPRECHUNG AUF PARLAMENTARISCHE WILLEN-
SBILDUNG UND SOZIALE REALITAT 52 (1984) (discussing the "pre-emptive effect" of Fed-
eral Constitutional Court decisions).
11. FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU Oct. 21, 1974 at 2.
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The debate on judges' creative relationship to the law is older than the
Federal Constitutional Court's jurisdiction. Montesquieu's saying that
the judge is the mouth that utters the words of the law is still often
quoted, but only to fix a cheap point of attack for doubts. Over a century
ago, enlightened jurists were already rejecting the view of the judge's task
as a purely intellectual operation, like any other judgement. That is, like
a logical operation with the statutory provision as the major term and the
facts to be adjudicated the minor term. If that were so, the judge would
need nothing but "a reliable edition of the law, the art of reading, care,
and sound, clear human reason."' 2 Yet the legal order is neither without
lacunae, free of contradiction, linguistically unambiguous nor above so-
cial change.' 3 This is particularly true of constitutional law, which is
marked by a low density of regulation and vague wordings.' 4
Not just general clauses, but a multiplicity of undefined legal concepts
delegate actual norm making to the judge. They open up semantic room
for maneuvers, allowing for not just one correct decision. Judicial deci-
sion is not only finding, but always also law-making. "In every act of
judicial application of law ... cognitive and volitional elements form an
indissoluble combination."' 15 The judge creates law in the process of find-
ing a decision. Accordingly, adjudication always has a political dimension
too.
This is certainly true of constitutional jurisdiction; the Basic Law's arti-
cles are marked by a low degree of definiteness. They are norms with
great openness and margins of interpretation that are hard to delimit. 16
The Basic Law essentially contains, apart from the law on the organiza-
tion of the State, principles that must first be spelled out before they can
be applied.' 7 One example is the constitutional principle that the Federal
Republic is a social state.18 But also in the fundamental rights context
too, terms are used whose content can be made definite only by interpre-
tation or even evaluation, sometimes through recourse to extra-legal no-
tions and historical experience.' 9 Consider the dignity of the person
protected by Article 1 of the Basic Law, or that of the family, which by
Article 6 of the Basic Law enjoys the special protection of the State. The
openness and breadth of the Basic Law should not be pointed to as de-
fects. On the contrary, a constitution can generally be regarded as suc-
12. OSKAR BOLOW, GESETZ UND RICHTERARMT 14 (1885).
13. See Dieter Grimm, Politik und Recht, in GRUNDRECHTE, SOZIALE ORDNUNG UND
VERFASSUNGSGERICHTSIIARKEIT: FESTSCHRIFr FOR ERNST BENDA 91, 99 (1995).
14. See KONRAD HESSE, GRUNDZOGE DES VERFASSUNGSRECHTS DER BUNDESREPUB-
LIK DEUTSCHLAND 11 (20th ed. 1995).
15. See Grimm, supra note 13, at 100.
16. See Hesse, supra note 14, at 20; WOLFGANG ZEIDLER, VERFASSUNGSGERICHT-
SBARKEIT, GESETZGEBUNG UND POLITISCHE FOHRUNG, EIN CAPPENBERGER GESPRACH
46 (1980).
17. See Ernst-Wolfgang BOckenfOrde, Die Methoden der Verfassungsinterpretation, in
STAAT, VERFASSUN6, DEMOKRATIE 53, 58 (2d ed. 1992); WILLI GEIGER, VERFASSUNG-
SENTWICKLUNG DURCH VERFASSUNGSGERICHTSBARKEIT 4.
18. GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] [GG] art. 20(1) (F.R.G.).
19. See Geiger, supra note 17, at 4.
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cessful if it is couched tersely and vaguely. If a constitution is not open
and therefore "to some extent capable of ever-new interpretation" it will,
as Willy Geiger rightly says, "inevitably soon come into hopeless contra-
diction with its object, and reach the critical point where the only choice
left open would be to break it, i.e., to disregard it, or else continually and
very quickly adapt it formally to changing needs."'20
B. JUDICIAL SELF-RESTRAINT
Judicial self-restraint, the maxim often recommended to the Court, is, if
taken literally, more misleading than persuasive. The call for judicial self-
restraint serves neither to locate grey areas of law and politics, nor to
clear them up. Moreover, judicial self-restraint cannot be a general strat-
egy for a court whose primary duty is to check power and assert the pro-
tection of fundamental rights. The latter task may, as Konrad Hesse
rightly stresses, call for resolute intervention rather than restraint, even at
the risk of affronting some other constitutional organ.2' As for the
formula of judicial self-restraint, Benda rightly calls it an attitude or a
virtue: the Court cannot limit its own power and function, but has to carry
out its tasks.22 Of course, the Court may not extend its own power or
function either, due to the principle of separation of powers that must be
respected. 23 The slogan of judicial self-restraint is just as correct in prac-
tice as the contrary call on lawmakers to display more "political self-con-
fidence."'24 Neither maxim serves an informative function: they merely
formulate a problem, but do not offer any criteria for solving it.
C. THE CASE LAW OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
The Federal Constitutional Court must follow a precisely formulated
catalogue of competences. Once an application is admissible, it must be
decided on by the Court. As for the decision themselves, it may be im-
portant that issues are not decided on the basis of legal criteria and con-
siderations, or concern responsibilities of other constitutional bodies than
the Federal Constitutional Court.
This sort of conflict situation has repeatedly been discussed in decisions
of the Federal Constitutional Court. Constitutional theorists have sought,
on the basis of these self-restraining judicial utterances, to derive norma-
tive guidelines. But in an attempt to mark the boundaries of the judicial
areas of responsibility, they have not managed to demonstrate a system
of criteria and methods, but only to name some groups of problematic
20. Id. at 5.
21. See Konrad Hesse, Funktionelle Grenzen der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit, in RECHT
ALS PROZE3 UND GEFOGE, FESTSCHRIFr FOR HANS HUBER 261, 264 (1981).
22. See Ernst Benda, Constitutional Jurisdiction in West Germany, 19 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 11 (1981).
23. See id.
24. See LANDFRIED, supra note 10, at 175.
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cases. 25 These relate either to particular decisional structures or to sub-
ject areas. Thus, the Court is expected to and in fact does exercise re-
straint in cases involving forecast decisions or expediency considerations.
The same limitation applies to reviewing legislative and executive acts in
the foreign and economic policy spheres.
The most prominent example of a forecast decision is the Federal Con-
stitutional Court's Kalkar decision on the Nuclear Act.26 This regulates
the peaceful use of nuclear energy and protection against its hazards. The
background to the decision was the protest by a citizen against the build-
ing of a nuclear power station. The Federal Constitutional Court was
presented with the question of whether Parliament had precisely regu-
lated the permit procedure. Was it enough to hold the authority, in rela-
tion to the dangers, only to the given state of scientific and technical
progress? Or should the legislators set more precise standards to mark
the boundary of the bearable residual risk unambiguously?
The Federal Constitutional Court answered the second question nega-
tively, and found that the basic decision for or against the legal admissi-
bility of the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy was a matter for the
legislature alone. Its primacy resulted not just from the far-reaching
repercussions of the decisions for the citizens, but also from the limits to
human cognitive capacity. In such a "situation necessarily loaded with
uncertainty," it lay "primarily in the political responsibility of the legisla-
ture and the government.., to take the decisions they saw fit. Given this
position, it is not the Court's task to stand in for the appointed political
institutions with their own assessment. There are no legal criteria for
that."'27 Of course, uncertainty as to the side-effects of a law "in an un-
certain future" does not require refraining from enacting the law. The
Court points to practical reason, for assessing the hazards of nuclear en-
ergy, which it evidently sees as better left to the legislature. 28
The non-binding nature of the criteria postulated in the codetermina-
tion judgement can readily be shown on the basis of other case law exam-
ples listed there. Take the area of foreign policy, often cited as an
example of judicial self-restraint. Thus, in the judgment on the Basic
Treaty with the German Democratic Republic, the Court wished neither
to exercise criticism nor to express its views on the prospects for the then
federal government's reunification policy. Responsibility for choosing
the political ways and means towards this State objective of the Basic
Law lay with the political bodies alone. 29 By contrast, in the Maastricht
judgment, the Court discussed the political ways and means chosen by the
25. Cf, e.g., Gunnar Folke Schuppert, Self-restraints der Rechtsprechung, in
DVBL 1191, 1194 (1988) (illustrating a weather attempt at classification).
26. See BverfGE 49, 89 (127).
27. Id. at 131.
28. The Court stresses that in view of the limited empirical knowledge, one could not
demand of the legislature a regulation that would rule out endangerment of fundamental
rights with absolute certainty. Cf. BVerfGE 49, 89 (143).
29. See BVerfGE 36, 1 (18).
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federal government towards the goal of European integration entirely
critically.30 The Maastricht decision is a good example, as a voice in the
academic sphere put it, "of how the Federal Constitutional Court copes
with the German tendency to constitutionalize foreign policy ques-
tions."' 31 As a prominent example where the importance of the object of
legal protection at issue demanded intensive judicial review, the protec-
tion of nascent life intended by the abortion law is readily cited.32 By
contrast, in the Kalkar decision the Court, despite the far-reaching reper-
cussions of the option in favor of the peaceful use of nuclear energy for
the life and limb of citizens,33 saw no occasion for an intensive review of
the Nuclear Act.
We need not go into whether other viewpoints have justified judicial
self-restraint or activeness in this or that case. We wish only to show that
the principle of judicial self-restraint which the Court strove for in the
codetermination judgement has indeed been properly described in its
generality. It "is aimed at keeping open for the other constitutional or-
gans the room for free political action guaranteed them by the constitu-
tion."' 34 Yet it has not been possible to give this precept shape against the
background of the leading cases with a catalogue of criteria. The formula
of judicial self-restraint offers nothing more than a rhetorical structure of
argument that only gives information about the problem to be solved and
the intellectual effort proposed.
D. FUNCTIONAL LIMITS TO CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION
Even the Court's most passionate critics have not managed to draw a
line between the overlapping competencies of legislation and jurisdiction.
This is not a consequence of intellectual laziness, but rather has to do
with the amalgamation of law and politics, which cannot be puristically
dissolved. Increasingly, more attention is being paid to constitutional
principles whose infringement is continually alleged in cases of boundary
disputes, mainly the principle of separation of powers and the democratic
principle. Of course, this approach does not offer a simple answer either.
1. The Principle of Separation of Powers
Attention should be directed first to the principle of separation of pow-
ers, which is not to be understood in the sense of a strict separation of
legislature, executive, and judiciary. Rather, it distributes power and re-
sponsibility by putting bearers of power under control. Surely, the free-
dom-guaranteeing aspect of separation of powers, aimed at moderating
the use of power and protecting citizens against government interference,
30. See BVerfGE 89, 155.
31. Juliane Kokott, German Constitutional Jurisprudence and European Integration, in
2 EUROPEAN PUBLIC L. 413, 416.
32. See BVerfGE 39, 1 (51); cf BVerfGE 88, 203 (340).
33. See BVerfGE 49, 89 (127).
34. BVerfGE 50, 1 sub 2.
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is of particular importance. But for our problem, the functional aspect is
more helpful. The principle of separation of powers is primarily aimed at
having government decisions taken as correctly as possible. To be sure,
by having the bodies best suited make decisions because of their organi-
zation, composition, function and procedures. This allocation of tasks is
made according to priority areas, but without any claim to exclusivity.
Functional overlaps, for instance, in creative legal interpretation by
courts, are part of this allocation from the outset. Creative and therefore
social-patterning elements in constitutional case law are not illegitimate
per se either. Nonetheless, the Court must always bear in mind that the
Basic Law has made the legislature the "central actor" in shaping the
political community. Its autonomy of action is comprehensive and it can,
by contrast to the Federal Constitutional Court, act of its own volition.
On the basis of an external impetus, the Court can only act reactively to
review decisions already taken. While the legislature can observe the ef-
fects of its decisions and, should these be undesirable, make corrections if
necessary, the method of trial and error is not open to the Court. Unlike
the legislature, the Court cannot revise its judicial pronouncements by
itself.
2. The Democratic Principle
This principle requires respect, notwithstanding its separation of pow-
ers aspect, particularly when legislative measures come onto the test-
bench of the Federal Constitutional Court. It is not the Federal Constitu-
tional Court's business to decree a detailed regulatory program qua Basic
Law. The narrower the Court weaves the net of constitutional postulates
and requirements, the more it restricts the legislature's possible actions
and cripples its political imagination.
The openness of the political process is essential to democracy. In all
areas not adequately provided for in constitutional law, as Grimm says,
"the democratic principle requires that only those who can be held ac-
countable through the vote may decide."'35
Response by the citizens in regular elections does not apply to the
members of the Federal Constitutional Court. The judges stand outside
the day-to-day political struggle. Their personal and material indepen-
dence, guaranteed in the Basic Law, is intended to make them immune
specifically to political requirements, and guarantee that the law alone
counts. Judgment as to the optimum realization of the common welfare is
by contrast a matter for politics.
3. Value Conflicts in the Pluralist Social Order
If conflicts between values are made the object of abstract constitu-
tional review, then account must also be taken of the fact that the Basic
Law has opted for a pluralist social order. In conflict situations where
35. Grimm, supra note 13.
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fundamental rights positions clash, the verdict on the constitutionality of
a law is not a matter purely of judicial acuity or the art of constitutional
interpretation. Instead, what is called for is a weighing, an evaluation.
As an example, we may take the conflict on abortion law, which occu-
pied the Federal Constitutional Court in 1993. Here, the constitutionally
protected right to life of the unborn and the mother's fundamental rights
position had to be weighed against each other. The legislature had re-
solved this value conflict in 1992 with a time-limit concept. According to
this, termination of pregnancy within twelve weeks of conception was not
unlawful and, therefore, exempt from punishment. Hardly any statute
has been so thoroughly debated in the Bundestag, or so massively under-
pinned academically by the securing of expert opinions as this one. The
final text of the act was a hard-fought compromise in the Federal Parlia-
ment based on many competing preliminary drafts.
The Federal Constitutional Court, invoked by the defeated minority in
Parliament, nonetheless quashed the law and decided that termination of
pregnancy is to be treated as wrong for the whole duration of the preg-
nancy. It declared admissible a consultative model that combined the
time-limit solution with compulsory counseling. The parliamentary ma-
jority, defeated in court, responded-it could hardly do otherwise-with
the accusation that the Court in Karlsruhe was once again presuming to
do the legislators' job.
Certainly it is the task of the Federal Constitutional Court to decide
authoritatively on the constitutionality of provisions brought before it;
however, it must be mindful that such determinations are the outcome of
a multi-layered process of evaluation. There is no absolute correctness to
such decisions; or at least it is not attainable for us here on earth. The
dissenting opinions of judges on many such decisions are proof of this
perception.
Differences of opinion among judges are not just random. Historical,
cultural, and socially divergent views as to values held by those adjudicat-
ing play a part. We all know that there is a prior understanding that also,
more or less consciously, influences the acquisition of law. This has noth-
ing to do with bias or prejudice. Instead, we are all marked by this sort of
basic attitude preceding any legal cognition, which is more experienced
with intuitive conviction than acquired rationally. It is a mixture of
moral, legal, philosophical, and political convictions, that include a partic-
ular conception of reality.
Accordingly, the Court has to bear in mind that the election of parlia-
mentary representatives has ensured a particularly broad spectrum of
such interpretations. This compels reticence in relation to the products of
parliamentary work. Therefore, in a case of conflicting value judgements,
the Federal Constitutional Court should pay attention to the procedure of
lawmaking rather than the outcome; that is, the process of political opin-




Intellectual honesty compels us to state that there is no usable cata-
logue of criteria which could serve as a signpost in the ridge-walking be-
tween law and politics. The two fields of action partly overlap and cannot
be separated from one other unambiguously. As the constitutional re-
view body, the Court has a share in politics. The problem to be consid-
ered is the scope of the Court's responsibility. The test criteria, or
maxims, are the structural principles of the Basic Law, which have as
their object the interplay and contrary motion of judicial review and po-
litical activity. These are necessarily very abstract, and denote only stages
in a thought process. The horizon of reflection marked by the principle
of separation of powers and the democratic principle must be paced off in
thought for every decision. Although these principles are only types of
reflection, they should not be misinterpreted as being more or less non-
binding appeals to constitutional judges. What is at stake here is not vol-
untary self-restraint, but the fulfillment of a constitutional precept. The
sensitive definition of its own sphere of responsibility is a self-evident
duty for an organ of government, which according to the Constitution
must, through the separation of governmental powers, watch over their
balanced exercise.
V. THE SOCIAL IMPACT OF PROTECTING
FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS
Let me draw your attention to the theory that the Court's jurisdiction
concerning fundamental rights has promoted the development of a civic
society in Germany. By this, I mean a society of participating citizens
who know their constitutional rights and defend them against infringe-
ments by the State. Individuals may file a constitutional complaint claim-
ing that a public authority has violated one or more of their
constitutionally guaranteed rights. In these cases, the primary object of
review is usually the decision of a lower court. But, if necessary, the orig-
inal government act and the law on which the decisions are based may
also be evaluated, since no act or court decision can be constitutional
when the underlying law is unconstitutional. The complaint may be
lodged against any official action, including judicial decisions or adminis-
tration regulations.
A constitutional complaint requires acceptance for adjudication. A
complaint must be accepted if: (i) it is of fundamental constitutional im-
portance; (ii) the claimed infringement of fundamental rights is of special
severity; or (iii) the complainant would suffer particularly severe detri-
ment from failure to decide the issue. 36 The Federal Constitutional Court
must determine whether a complaint satisfies the prerequisites for accept-
ance before actually deciding a constitutional complaint.
The Federal Constitutional Court has certainly been active in terms of
unfolding and developing fundamental rights. Through a series of indi-
36. See § 93a BVerfGG.
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vidual cases, it has developed, for example, a law of privacy, especially
the right of informational self-determination, and principles of fair trial.
The Court's case law concerning the basic rights of freedom of speech
contributed significantly to the shape of the Basic Law and to the devel-
opment of the free, democratic, rule-of-law state of the Federal Republic
of Germany. Furthermore, it attests to the readiness of the German peo-
ple to learn from the failure of the Weimar Republic and the reign of
terror which existed between 1933 and 1945. This historical jurisdiction,
starting with the Lath case (1958) and concluding with the Auschwitz De-
nial case (1994), clearly illustrates how the Court has tried to grapple with
a disastrous past.
I am convinced that the German citizens have understood that they are
being called upon to be the guardians of the Constitution by way of the
right to file constitutional complaints. Due to their attention, their sense
of law, and, last but not least, their mind to oppose, the Federal Constitu-
tional Court was able to act as the guardian of the Basic Rights. With its
jurisdiction on the Basic Rights, the Court broke with authoritarian tradi-
tions and outlined the principles of the free and democratic rule-of-law
state. On the one hand, the decisions on freedom of speech and the press
have to be mentioned. These decisions rendered the Basic Rights of com-
munication to be essentially constitutive for a free and democratic stately
order, because it is through them that the constant intellectual debate is
possible, which is the characteristic element of democracy. On the other
hand, the jurisdiction regarding the principles of due process and fair trial
have to be mentioned. These rule-of-law principles are to guarantee that
all the decisive facts and aspects of a case come up, and that the accused,
or the person seeking justice, is not degraded as an object of procedure.
Last, but not least, these decisions also intend to show to the citizens as
well as to the public persons involved that the Basic Rights are directly
applicable law.
The history of the Federal Constitutional Court's impact is a story of
success. This is true irrespective of the fact that it has repeatedly un-
leashed a barrage of critical fire with its decisions. Even these decisions
have never been able to shake the people's trust in the Court perma-
nently. It may be said without exaggerating that the Federal Constitu-
tional Court has become a citizens' court par excellence. 37 Such
popularity is not raised up above all doubt. This is true especially when
the other institutions that guarantee pluralism (the variety of opinion)
suffer from a decline in public trust. For instance, the press, the trade
unions, employer associations, churches, the federal government, and
parliament as well as the political parties are all primarily in the negative
zone of the trust scale for public institutions in the Federal Republic of
Germany.
37. See Peter Hiberle, Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit als politische Kraft, in VERFASSUNG-
SGERICHTSBARKEIT ZWISCHEN POLITIK UND RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 59, 79 (1980).
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Does the unbroken great trust in the authority of constitutional juris-
diction point to some political mistrust of democracy? As H~iberle rightly
warns, "[t]he German faith in constitutional jurisdiction must not be al-
lowed to turn into lack of faith in democracy. '38
38. Id.
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